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International human rights litigation in Africa is evolving in ways that few could have foreseen 
only a decade ago.1 Human rights attorneys and civil society groups now focus much of their 
advocacy efforts not on the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies of the African Charter on human 
rights2 system, (the African Court and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) but on sub-
regional courts associated with economic integration communities in East, West, and Southern 
Africa.3 The East African Court of Justice (EACJ),4 the Court of Justice of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS),5 and the Tribunal of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)6 have received few suits challenging trade restrictions and 
barriers to trade in the sub-regional sphere.7 Instead, and surprisingly, these courts’ dockets are 
dominated by complaints alleging violations of international human rights law.8  
The sub-regional economic courts (also known as Regional Economic courts, from here 
henceforth known as SRICS, Sub-Regional International Courts) in West, East, and Southern 
Africa share a number of similarities.9 These judiciaries were not created to hear cases alleging 
violations of international human rights law.10 Instead, they were tasked with improving the 
enforcement of the regional integration, regional trade, and thus as a result of this mandate they 
are known as sub-regional economic courts (SRICs).11 
                                                            
1 Laurence R. Helfer Sub-regional Courts in Africa: “Litigating the Hybrid Right to Freedom of Movement” iCourts 
Working Paper Series, No. 32, (2015). 
2 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 June 
(1981). 
3 Laurence R Helfer, Litigating the Hybrid Rights to Freedom of Movement, 5. 
4 The Amended Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community (as amended on 14 December 2006 and 
20 August 2007). 
5 The Revised Treaty of Economic Community of the West African States (as amended in 1993). 
6The Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (1980). 
7 Laurence R Helfer, Litigating the Hybrid Rights to Freedom of Movement, 5. 
8 Laurence R Helfer, Litigating the Hybrid Rights to Freedom of Movement, 5. 
9 Laurence R Helfer, Litigating the Hybrid Rights to Freedom of Movement, 5. 
10 Laurence R Helfer, Litigating the Hybrid Rights to Freedom of Movement, 5. 
11 James Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights 
Strategy, 249, 250 (2014). 
 2 
 
 For the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal, the variation to human rights occurred through a 
purposive interpretation of the governing treaties’ principles and objectives clauses adopted by 
sub-regional judges in response to advocacy by law societies and private litigants.12 In West 
Africa, the expansion into human rights resulted from an extrajudicial advocacy campaign by 
international judges, civil society groups, and Community officials to convince member states to 
broaden the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction.13 In West Africa, the consideration into human rights 
resulted from an advocacy campaign by international judges, civil society groups, and 
Community officials to convince member states to broaden the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction.14  
In effect, the SRICs have introduced a new layer of supranational protection and promotion of 
human rights in Africa. These courts now play an important role in the protection of human 
rights through the determination of human rights cases. This study underscores the significance 
of this role and its impact on the protection of human rights in Africa. 
1.2 Statement of problem 
The sub- regional courts in Africa were not created with the intent of handling human rights 
cases.15  However, the entry of SRICs as an avenue for protection of rights is generally favorably 
hailed.16 There is a particular need to establish the place of SRICs within the African human 
rights system (AHRS) and their relationship with the regional human rights institutions 
specifically the African Court on Human and People’s Rights.17 Although it may be 
advantageous to have as many institutions as possible to enhance the promotion and protection of 
human rights. The consequence of this is the overlapping judicial powers of organs, which raise 
concerns such as the possibility of divergent conclusions on the same issues and duplication of 
efforts, particularly when different courts have jurisdiction over the same case.18 There is also 
                                                            
12 James Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance, 249, 250. 
13 James Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance, 249, 250. 
14 Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Jacqueline McAllister, A New International Human Rights Court for West 
Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 737–39 (2013). 
15 Treaty Establishing the East Africa Court of Justice (Adopted 30 Nov. 1999, into force 7 July 2000) (establishing 
a regional economic community between Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania), Treaty Establishing the 
Economic Community of West African States (adopted and enacted 24 July 1993), Treaty Establishing the Southern 
African Development Community (adopted and entered into force 17 Aug. 1992). 
16 F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) Oxford University Press for a general discussion on 
the changing trend in the RECs 497-8. 
17 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 June 
(1981). 
18 F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa, 497. 
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concern over their capacity to effectively exercise the new competence in light of the economic 
focus of their founding treaties.19 
1.3 Justification of the study 
The foundation of this research is based on international law, application of international law and 
jurisdiction of sub-regional courts in Africa. It is important to have this research conducted since 
it will fill the gaps in the literature by giving the reasons why it is crucial that the SRIC’s 
integrate human rights into the domain of regional economic communities. This study is justified 
on the basis of analyzing the jurisdiction and addressing the issue of the human rights 
jurisdiction, and economic jurisdiction of SRIC’s on a sub-regional basis, while at the same time 
looking at the ACtHPR on a regional and continental basis.  
This study contributes to the debate surrounding the suitability of SRICs as avenues for 
protection of human rights in view of the economic focus of SRICs. It identifies adjustments that 
can be made within the African Human Rights Systems (AHRS) to deal with the challenges 
associated with the development of SRICs both in the interim and in the long-term. 
Lastly, the member states have been criticizing the SRIC’s human rights jurisdiction and 
therefore, it would be essential that this research discuss the issue of backlash from states and 
clearly relate the function of SRIC’s not only as economic adjudicators but also as human rights 
courts.    
1.4 Statement of Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to explain the mandate of the Regional Economic Courts in 
Africa, and critically discuss the overlapping jurisdiction of the Regional Economic Courts and 
the African Court and African Commission of Human and People’s Rights. The specific 
objectives will be to: 
1. To discuss the historical development of the SRICs and the Human Rights Courts 
specifically in Africa.  
2. Explain and analyze the courts established as SRICs and those established as Human 
Rights Courts.  
                                                            
19 James Thuo Gathii “African Regional Trade Agreement as Legal Regimes” 264 (2011).  
 4 
 
3. To discuss the backlash that the SRICs are facing from the States which the courts 
exercise jurisdiction over. 
1.5 Research Questions 
This study will address the following interrelated questions: 
1. What are the Sub-Regional Economic Courts and what are the mandates of the SRICs? 
2. What effect will the granting of jurisdiction to SRICs have on the ACHPR? 
3. What explains the backlash from States within Africa to the expanded jurisdiction of the 
SRICs to hear human rights cases? 
1.6 Hypothesis 
This research proceeds on the presumption that:  
1. The sub- regional courts in Africa should maintain the mandate which was given as 
SRICs. 
2. The human rights jurisdiction should be left to the African Court of Human and People’s 
Rights and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.  
3. The member states of the regional communities will be unwilling to cooperate with the 
Sub-regional Economic Courts. 
1.7 Research Methodology  
The work is based on desktop research. The information used is obtained from secondary sources 
particularly text books, journals, case law and internet resources. The work uses the example of 
the East African Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice and the Southern 
African Development Community Tribunal to illustrate the issues surrounding human rights 
mandate of SRICs. The conclusions which shall be drawn from the secondary sources will assist 
in understanding and creating a basis for answering the research questions, and further disregard 
or support the hypothesis. 
In furtherance of answering the research questions, the work also uses primary research, through 
an interview of a leading human rights advocate in Kenya Mohamed Ruwange and a 




1.8 Limitations  
There are several other SRICs however due to the limited scope of this study the main focus will 
be on the three courts discussed above, ECOWAS, EACJ and SAC. In addition, due to my bias 
towards the importance of human rights especially in African states I may have slight bias 
leaning towards complete and compulsory jurisdiction being awarded to the SRICs. 
1.9 Literature Review 
There is a growing body of literature regarding the role of sub-regional courts in the protection of 
human rights. Over the past decades, apart from the creation of the continental body known as 
the African Union (AU), there has been an expanse of sub-regional economic communities 
(RECs).20 
SRICs serve as the building blocks for the economic integration of Africa.21While pursuing these 
goals, they recognize the enhanced role of human rights, inter alia, as a means to their economic 
development.22 For purposes of comparison in the Algiers Declaration,23 African leaders 
identified a political environment in which human rights are observed as a precondition to 
economic growth, they also recognized that conflict, one of the obstacles to economic growth, 
may arise from the violation of human rights24 therefore an indication of the recent emergence of 
SRICs as human rights courts. 
Oliver Ruppel asserts that although SRICs, as sub-regional institutions, do not explicitly have 
human rights at the core of their agenda, it becomes increasingly evident that human-rights-
related topics play an important role in their legal framework and implementation25. This is as a 
                                                            
20 These were formed under various treaties such as the Treaty Establishing the East African Community (1999), 
which was adopted in 1999 and became operational on 18 July 2010; the Treaty of the Economic Community of 
West African States (1975) (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty of ECOWAS); and the Treaty of the Southern 
African Development Community (1999), (SADC Treaty). See Viljoen International Human Rights Law 488.  
21 Art 88(1), Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, adopted in 1991 in Abuja, Nigeria and entered 
into force in 1994. 
22 Magdalena Sepúlveda et. al. (2004), Human Rights Reference Handbook (San Jose: University for Peace), p.403; 
Oliver Christian Ruppel ‘Regional economic communities and human rights in East and southern Africa’ in Anton 
Bösl & Joseph Diescho (eds) (2009). 
23 Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place 
in the World (the Algiers Declaration), OAU Doc AHG/Decl.1(XXVI), para 10 - 11. 
24 Rachel Murray (2004), Human Rights in Africa: from the OAU to the African Union (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press), p.126. 
25 Oliver Ruppel, “Regional economic communities and human rights in East and southern Africa”. 
 6 
 
result of many African countries recently committing themselves to respecting human rights by 
acceding to human rights treaties, conventions and declarations.26  
Viljoen offers a background to the development of SRICs in Africa while highlighting the 
gradual evolution of rights into their agenda and the development of a human rights competence 
for SRICs. He highlights the significant contribution of SRICs to the protection of human rights 
in the region and potential benefits of their continued role in this regard.27 
Reginald Nsekela further identified the importance of broadening the jurisdiction of the EACJ 
stating that it is important that the EACJ treaty28 be amended to give the EACJ the authority to 
handle and try human rights violations.29 The Community Court Protocal also authorized 
individuals to bring cases of violations of human rights before the Community Court of Justice 
under the ECOWAS treaty.30  Karen J. Alter asserts the fact that the ECOWAS Court also has 
broadened access and standing rules that permit individuals and NGOs to bypass national courts 
and file suits directly with the court thus eliminating the requirement to exhaust domestic 
remedies.31  
With regard to jurisdiction Ruppel argues that in the absence of express provisions vesting 
human rights jurisdiction on them, the content of their founding treaties notwithstanding, they 
lack such jurisdiction.32 
In all the SRICs the judges themselves asserted the authority to adjudicate human rights claims. 
In Africa, the political and legal consequences of these bold assertions of competence are still 
                                                            
26 Oliver Ruppel, “Regional economic communities and human rights in East and southern Africa” in Anton Bösl & 
Joseph Diescho (eds) (2009) Human Rights Law in Africa: Legal perspectives on their protection and Promotion Mc 
Millan Education Namibia 319 – 350. 
27 F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) Oxford University Press for a general discussion on 
the changing trend in the RECs 497-8. 
28 Treaty Establishing the East African Community (1999).  
29 President of the East Africa Court of Justice, H.R. Nsekela, “The Role of East African Court of Justice in the 
Integration Process,” presentation during the 3rd East African Community Media Summit (2009). 
30 Community Court Protocol A/P.1/7.91 Art 10(d). 
31 Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Jacqueline R. McAllister, A New International Human Rights Court For 
West Africa: The Ecowas Community Court of Justice, Vol. 107:737 (2013). 
32 OC Ruppel ‘Regional economic communities and human rights in East and Southern Africa’ 319 – 350. 
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unfolding, but early evidence indicates that the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal have faced greater 
opposition from governments than has the ECOWAS Court.33  
For all three sub-regional communities, membership brought with it the compulsory jurisdiction 
of a sub-regional court. Unilateral withdrawal from the court’s jurisdiction was not a legally 
viable option without exiting the Community as a whole. All three courts also provided direct 
access by private litigants alleging state violations of Community treaties, which expressly or 
implicitly incorporate references to human rights.34 
The above assertions by the scholars have comprehensively discussed the value of the SRICs as 
human rights courts, this however has not been discussed through looking at the performance of 
these courts in making decisions and the sufficiency of the remedies available to the victims. 
















33 Solomon Tamarabrakemi Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-regional Courts in Africa, 17AFR. 
J.INT’L&COMP. L. 79(2009); James Gathii, The Under- appreciated Jurisprudence of Africa’s Regional Trade 
Judiciaries, 12OR. REV. INT’LL.245(2010).  
34 Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii and Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and 





2.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical background to this study. This foundation 
creates a basis for answering the research questions posed in the earlier chapter and seek to either 
support the hypothesis or the reality, which was introduced through the literature review.  
This chapter will first of all discuss in depth the theoretical background relating to this research 
study and give a breakdown of the historical development of SRICs through the literature 
review. 
2.2 Classical Theory by Jeremy Bentham 
Classical positivists such as Jeremy Bentham and Blackstone coined the term international law 
and this is crucial to show the enforceability and the reasons for compliance problems of 
international laws. This concept of International law was derived as a result of the principle of 
the “law of nations” which categorically stated,  
“the law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by 
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world; in order to decide all disputes, to 
regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to ensure the observance of justice and good faith, in 
that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the 
individuals belonging to each.”35 
Jeremy Bentham further elaborated on the word “international law” in 1789,36 when he 
categorized the law into five different categories. These different categories were, the extent of 
the law, political quality, time, expression and punishment, these five being the "circumstances 
that have given rise to the principal branches of jurisprudence.37 In categorizing International 
law, Jeremy Bentham posited that it should considered as a branch of political quality,38 he 
explains this by stating that international law was created so as to balance national laws and act 
                                                            
35 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on The Laws Of England (a facsimile of the first edition 1765-1769, University of 
Chicago ed. 1979) 
36 J. Bentham, an Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Burns & Hart eds.) (1970). 
37 M. W. Janis,  Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 405-418 Apr, (1984). 
38 M. W. Janis,  Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 405-418 Apr, (1984). 
 9 
 
as a counter to political influence.39 Jeremy Bentham further expounds on this and states that 
when it is an individual who is subject to the law, then this is governed by internal law, however, 
when it is states then international law is the governing law.40 
In Bentham’s theory of international law there are two assumptions which are propagated, first, 
he assumed that international law was exclusively about the rights and obligations of states inter 
se and not about rights and obligations of individuals.41 Second, he assumed that foreign 
transactions before municipal courts were always decided by internal, not international, rules. 
The assumptions above create the basis of international law as was and as it still is, thus implying 
that the explanation given by Bentham was the basis of international law.42 
The above definition was however, denied by John Austen who states that, “The law obtaining 
between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person 
or persons in a state of subjection to its author. The law obtaining between nations is law 
(improperly so called) set by general opinion. The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral 
sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking 
general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally 
received and respected.”43 This express opposition to Jeremy Bentham’s introduction to 
international law is based on the positivist theory, stating that international is not law but is a 
moral undertaking between countries.44 This nullifies the essence of Bentham’s denominating 
factor that international law is the law which governs the relations between states.45  
By way of introduction it is evident that the theory by Jeremy Bentham to a certain extent has 
merit, however, by means of comparison with the theory that shall be discussed below, this paper 
is posited based on the contemporary theorist of positive law H. LA. Hart. 
                                                            
39M. W. Janis,  Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 405-418 Apr, (1984).  
40 M. W. Janis,  Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 405-418 Apr, (1984). 
41 M. W. Janis,  Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 405-418 Apr, (1984). 
42 M. W. Janis,  Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 405-418 Apr, (1984). 
43 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 201 (ed. 1954) 
44 M. W. Janis,  Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law", The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 405-418 Apr, (1984). 
45 J. Bentham, an Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Burns & Hart eds.) (1970). 
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2.3  Contemporary Positivism by H. LA. Hart 
This study will rely on the legal positivist theory which is mainly backed by HLA Hart.46 The 
contemporary positivist accounts of international law, as they were developed in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, basically began with the voluntarist theories of international law. Georg 
Jellinek,47 for example, saw the basis for obligations under international law in an act of auto-
limitation by states.48 Heinrich Triepel refined this voluntarist theory surrogating the will of the 
individual states with the common will of states.49 This voluntarist approach to international law 
found its expression in the famous Lotus decision of the Permanent Court of Justice (PCIJ) in 
which the court held that ‘international law governs relations between independent States. The 
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law’.50 
As a doctrine, legal positivism is based on three pillars, the first is that international law has 
fixed sources and also fixed rules for making these laws.51 The second is the subjects of this law 
are the rightful participants in the system of rules, thus including states and citizens of the 
states.52 Lastly, are the sanctions which allow the international judicial bodies to securing 
compliance with the rules.53 As for the system and the rules created, the system of consent is just 
a basis but, more recently, the international judiciaries have formulated new methods. Which 
although,54 are based on consent such consent is not express, for instance the rules of 
international customary law as a source of international law.55 
Positivism thereby seems to imply not only a strong notion of sovereignty but also a strictly 
consensual character of international law: no state can be bound by a rule of international law 
                                                            
46 The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart (2011). 
47 Jochen von Bernstorff, “Georg Jellinek and the Origins of Liberal Constitutionalism in International Law” 3, 659-
675, (2012). 
48G. Jellinek, G. Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsverträge: ein Beitrag zur juristischen Construction des Völkerrechts. 
Vienna, Hoelder.), at 2, 48–49. 26, (1880). 
49 H. Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, at 32, 81. 27, (1899). 
50 S.S. Lotus, France VS. Turkey, PCIJ Series A, No. 10, 18, (1927). 
51 Francesco Parisi, George Mason University, International Legal Theory, Publication of The American Society of 
International Law Interest Group on The Theory of International Law, VOL 1 (1), (1995). 
52 Francesco Parisi, George Mason University, International Legal Theory, Publication of The American Society of 
International Law Interest Group on The Theory of International Law, VOL 1 (1), (1995). 
53 Francesco Parisi, George Mason University, International Legal Theory, Publication of The American Society of 
International Law Interest Group on The Theory of International Law, VOL 1 (1), (1995). 
54 Francesco Parisi, George Mason University, International Legal Theory, Publication of The American Society of 
International Law Interest Group on The Theory of International Law, VOL 1 (1), (1995). 
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unless it has explicitly or tacitly consented to it.56 The traditionally tight relationship between 
legal positivism and voluntarist conceptions of international law has led many scholars to believe 
that positivism necessarily implies a voluntarist approach to international law.57 Such an 
assessment constitutes a one-sided view of legal positivism which, in its international law 
dimension, does not have to be equated with voluntarism.58  The main assertion of legal 
positivism lies in the perception that all legal facts are determined by social facts alone, social 
facts are the will of states.59 
One of the propositions rejected by Hart is that the recognition of international law is based on 
the principle of sovereignty, which asserts that the sovereign is, by definition, above the law. 60 
Hart rejects this assumption and adopts an understanding of sovereignty as autonomy. 
Sovereignty exists only within the limits of international law and only to the extent that the rules 
of international law allow.61  
The theories described above links the essence of the treaties created and the treaty bodies in 
existence to sovereignty, what this implies is that states are independent and have the right to 
decline the interference of international law. It further builds a foundation for the argument that 
states are to some extent against the jurisdiction of the SRICs. 
2.4  The Fiduciary Theory of Human Rights 
The fiduciary theory will be informed by Evan Criddle and Evan Fox Decents conception of a 
fiduciary relationship.62 The principle contends that sub regional courts, because of the mere fact 
that they’re adjudicating institutions on an international scale, are fiduciary in nature. Human 
rights are best conceived as norms arising out of a fiduciary relationship between a state and 
citizens.63 Human rights are rights that all human beings share simply by virtue of their common 
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humanity.64 There are a plethora of theories as to the formation of human rights, however none 
of the theories adequately encapsulate their reason for being so jealously protected.65 Uncertainty 
regarding the scope of human rights the philosophical basis for human rights has impeded efforts 
to clarify its scope, justifiability, and cross cultural relevance.66 This lacunae is best filled by the 
fiduciary theory of international law or the principal agent theory of international law. It explains 
the reason why sub regional courts, although enshrined with jurisdiction to hear a given category 
of disputes, will exercise their discretion to hear matter pertaining to the human rights of citizens. 
Immannuel Kant’s theory of fiduciary relations must first be adumbrated in order to adequately 
capture the grasp of the principal agent relationship. This relationship avers that state and its 
institutions stand in fiduciary relationship to the citizens and non-citizens subject to it.67 The 
basic conception of Kant’s fiduciary underpinnings are the moral underpinnings of one person to 
place another under legal obligations whenever the former is subject to the unilateral 
administrative power of the former.68 What are these moral underpinnings? These moral 
underpinnings are the duty of sub regional courts, although not in the traditional scope of their 
jurisdiction, to hear and adjudicate over the rights of the subjects it stands in trust for. Sub 
Regional courts attain they’re legitimacy from the delegated jurisdiction accorded to them by the 
states that are signatories to they’re constitutive documents. These courts must protect human 
rights because they are constitutive of the state’s legal authority to provide security and legal 
order as a fiduciary.69This supports the reason that SRICs charge themselves with human rights 
adjudication, owing to the fact that socio-economic rights are those rights that give people access 
to certain basic needs necessary for human beings to lead a dignified life.70Because economics 
and human rights can’t be separated as regards the rights owed to the citizen, then conceivably 
they are held in trust by the state and all state organs, which include sub regional economic 
courts.  
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2.5  The Principle Agent Theory 
The principle agent theory is based on a delegation between the states and the international 
organizations and in this case the international judiciaries.71  This theory is proposed by Karen J 
Alter and bases the Agent- trustee relationship as a result of three facets, on is that the agent is 
selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, secondly it is given 
independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, 
and third it is empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary.72 With regard to international courts 
and the human rights mandate accorded to this court all decisions have to be made bearing in 
mind the relationship and duty towards the principles who are the states and the members of the 
state.73 The proponent of the theory has expressed that the principle agent relationship is based 
on the principle’s right to re-contract if at any point the principle is dissatisfied with the 
agreement. The option to re-contract may have a negative impact if the intention is with 
malicious intent.74 The SRICs were initially formed with the clear intention of ensuring 
economic cohesion, the reaction however, to the newly accorded human rights jurisdiction 
created the implication of a negative re-contracting as will be discussed in a chapter below.  
The entire mandate, treaty and appointment of judges in an international court is a delegated task 
by the states.75 The state has the power to formulate the terms of the treaty, the rules and mandate 
of the international court and the judge who will sit in the court. Although, the states cannot 
easily replace a judge of an international court, they may in future opt to not reappoint the judge 
for a further term.76 This power awarded to the principle in this case the member states of the 
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REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction into the historical development of SRIC’s 
Regional integration in post-colonial Africa began in 1963, with the adoption of the Charter of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).77 After the demise of colonial rule in Africa, mainly in 
the 1960s, the reality of the political and economic fragility of post-colonial African states 
became apparent.78 In response to this reality, African states were called upon to integrate 
politically and economically in order to achieve development and to undo the balkanization of 
Africa brought by colonialism.79  
The agenda of a stronger African continent was to be achieved through the development of the 
creation of a larger and united Africa which would develop the trade relations and increase the 
potential of poorer economies.80 Though this agenda was not immediately achieved at the 
regional level, states began to come together in their respective sub-regions following a pattern 
of geographical proximity.81 The idea to divide Africa into various Sub-regions was developed 
through the OAU (Organisation of African Unity), where Africa was as a result divided into 5 
main regions along geographical lines.82 As a consequence thereof, many REC’s have been 
categorized into Sub- Regional communities, based on geographical proximity.83  
In 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action addressing the political and economic crisis 
affecting African states.84 The Lagos plan envisioned a united Africa, which has regional, sub—
regional and national institutions in pursuit of the objective of the Plan, self-reliance and self- 
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centered development.85 It was through the Lagos Plan that the Abuja Treaty establishing the 
Africa Economic Community (AEC). 86 This treaty sets out the legal framework of the AEC and 
entrenches the position of SRICs as its building blocks.87  
This chapter will first of all give a breakdown of the historical development of SRICs through 
the literature review. It will further analyze the relationship between the SRICs and the African 
Human Rights System. 
3.2  Evolution of SRICs into Human Rights Mandated Courts  
At inception the SRICs stuck to their economic focus leaving the political issues to the wider 
continental forum.88 With respect to human rights, the feeling among some African leaders was 
that the issue was too political and could be used as a ‘pretext for intervening in their countries’ 
internal affairs’ hence it was argued that the ‘treatment of human rights more appropriately 
belonged in other international fora’.89  
With time, however, this position has been changed and there has been a shift in the initial 
economic focus of the SRICs to a human rights based approach. First, is through the adoption of 
the African Charter which made human rights a common feature in interstate relations on the 
continent and therefore, an important aspect of the communities.90 The obligations of states 
emanating from the Charter and other human rights treaties to which African states are party, 
oblige them to reflect human rights protection in subsequent commitments such as those arising 
from SRIC treaties.91 Second, human rights coupled with good governance create an appropriate 
investment climate that is critical to furthering economic development.92 The adoption of strong 
human rights values and institutions creates confidence for investors and trading partners and 
ensures effective participation of individuals. 
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SRICs tend to have an institutional structure that includes a court which is the judicial or 
principal legal organ of the community to deal with controversies relating to the interpretation or 
application of the SRIC’s law.93 As the organs vested with such responsibility, they have, as a 
result of the incorporation of human rights into the agenda of SRICs, been required to adjudicate 
over cases, to interpret provisions of their treaties or to advise their principals on questions with 
implications for human rights. The treaties of most SRICs have therefore gradually moved 
towards according SRIC courts competence to hear human rights cases.94 
To fully understand the SRICs development and evolution in the human rights adjudication, it is 
therefore imperative to analyse the SRIC Courts individually to grasp the depth of the necessity 
and the approaches in use by the various communities.  
3.3  Economic Community of West African States 
The Economic Community of West African States was established on the 28th May 1975.95 The 
organization is head quartered in Abuja, Nigeria and was the outgrowth for the movement of 
West African self-reliance as a reaction to the collapse of colonialism in Africa.96 The 
Community’s primary goal as defined by the Treaty, were to promote corporation and 
development amongst member states in a wide array of issues such as, commerce, agriculture, 
natural resources, monetary and financial policy, security, social and cultural matters.97 
The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court) is the judicial arm and the 
principal legal organ of ECOWAS.98 It is charged with resolving disputes related to the 
Community’s treaty, protocols and conventions. Another objective of the ECOWAS Court is to 
resolve disputes relating to key ECOWAS instruments and programs, including the Protocol on 
Free Movement of Persons, Residents and Establishment, the Trade Liberalization Scheme, the 
Agricultural Cooperation Program and the Protocol on Community Enterprises.99 
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The human rights jurisdiction accorded to ECOWAS Court can be traced as far back to the 1990, 
when it was initiated as a result of the Liberian civil war.  It was recognized that although 
regional integration was the backbone of the ECOWAS Community, it was equally important to 
establish and incorporate political objectives, which also encompassed a human rights approach 
and mandate. Principle 4 of the Declaration of Political Principles of the Economic Community 
of West African States,100 provides that all member states must “respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all their plentitude”. Principle 5, further emphasizes this by stating all 
member states “will promote and encourage the full enjoyment by all our peoples of their 
fundamental human rights, especially their political, economic, social, cultural and other rights 
inherent in the dignity of the human person and essential to his free and progressive 
development”.  
The Protocol on ECOWAS did not confer human rights jurisdiction on the court initially.101 The 
court acquired jurisdiction in human rights matters as a result of the Supplementary Protocol of 
1991.102 The Human rights jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court is the power to hear cases for 
violations of the “so called community rights” endowed on ECOWAS citizens and the power of 
the court to receive cases on violations of the African Charter.  The former is similar to the inter-
state complaint mechanism of the African Charter,103 as the ECOWAS Court acquired access to 
bring human rights cases against a member state, where the state fails to perform its human 
rights obligation under ECOWAS legal regime.104  
The ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction on human right is largely due to the recognition that human 
rights and access to justice in the sub-region are fundamental values of the ECOWAS 
Community enshrined in Article 4 (g), 56(2), and 63(2) of the 1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty 
and Articles 9(4) and 10 (d)  of the 2005 Supplementary Protocol. Further, individuals can also 
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bring complaints that allege the violation of the African Charter and other human rights 
instruments before the EOWAS Courts. 105 
The ECOWAS Court was faced with one of its first human rights matters in Manneh vs. The 
Gambia,106 a case submitted against The Gambia by legal counsels of Chief Ebrimah Manneh, a 
Gambian journalist who was arrested by the national intelligence agency officials of the Gambia 
without a warrant of arrest, and a reason for arrest. He was secluded for a whole year and as a 
result the matter was instituted in the ECOWAS Courts, claiming the defendant had violated 
Articles, 4,5,6, and 7 of the African Charter.107 The Court in this matter found the Gambia to 
have been in contravention of Articles, 2, 6 and 7 (1), of the African Charter and thus made an 
ex-parte decision ordering the defendant to pay US$ 100,000 to the plaintiff as damages. 
3.4  The East African Community 
 The integration between the East African states was the first of its kind for time immemorial in 
Africa, established through the early form was inspired by a colonialist and imperialist purpose. 
Envisioned through the coordinated exploitation of East African resources by the British,108 
especially from the end of the First World War period when Tanganyika, an ex-German colony, 
joined Kenya and Uganda as British administered territories.109 The EAC was both a fully-
fledged Customs Union and a Common Market. A customs union is a form of trade agreement 
under which certain countries preferentially grant tariff free market access to each other’s 
imports and agree to apply a common set of external tariffs to imports from the rest of the 
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world.110 A common market on the other hand is, an agreement between two or more countries to 
eliminate all trade barriers and allow free movement of goods, labour and capital between the 
signatories of the agreement.111  The EAC therefore, shared railways and harbors, airlines, civil 
aviation, inland waterways, road transport systems, post and telecommunications, power and 
lighting, customs and tax management, health and medical research and aviation training.112  
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ), formerly known as Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa,113 the formal legal and judicial organ of the East African Community, was established by 
the Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community.114 The first mandate of the 
EACJ is to ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance 
with this Treaty.115 The jurisdiction of the EACJ is clearly spelt out by Article 27 of the EAC 
Treaty, which states that “The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and 
other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council.”116  To achieve the objectives set out 
above of economic, social and cultural integration,117 the EAC Treaty sets out fundamental and 
operational principles that include the promotion and protection of human rights.118  
With the lack of directly conferred human rights jurisdiction on the EACJ, in 2005, the 
secretariat of the EAC,119 developed a draft protocol120 for the expansion of the EACJ’s 
jurisdiction to include human rights.121 The process of consultation on the draft was scheduled to 
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be completed by August 2006, but this target was not met even as at the date of this work was 
unrealistic and created a gap for political influence because of the rush.122 
However, even with the express lack of human rights jurisdiction the EACJ did adjudicate over 
human rights matters, for instance, in the case of James Katabazi vs. Secretary General of the 
EAC,123 where fourteen applicants were detained and charged with treason, during a mention of 
their case in the High Court of Uganda, the detainees were granted bail and released. While 
leaving the court building, they were surrounded by security forces and re-arrested for possession 
of firearms and terrorism. The Court held that while it does not have jurisdiction over human 
rights violations per se, it may still consider cases if they fall under one of the provisions of 
Article 27(1), which sets out the jurisdiction of the Court, even if it also includes a human rights 
violation. One role of the Court is to interpret the Treaty, which includes “respect for the rule of 
law”.124 
3.5 The SADC tribunal 
The apartheid system in South Africa united many African states, influenced the regional 
integration of Southern African countries, and moved them to work together in the fight against 
the then white-minority rule in South Africa.125 As a result the Southern Africa Development Co-
ordination Conference, a loose association of states, was created in 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia and 
the resulting main goal was economic liberation.126 The Conference was transformed into the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)127 in 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia.128 The 
development of the SADC was due to insufficient funding of the former SADCC since, member 
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states funded the activities of the organization and it also failed one of the main objectives of 
liberalizing the then apartheid South Africa.129 
The SADC Community’s main objectives were envisaged to be the promotion of sustainable and 
equitable economic growth and socio-economic development; the promotion of common 
political values, systems and other shared values transmitted through democratic, legitimate and 
effective institutions; the consolidation, defense and maintenance of democracy, peace, security 
and stability; and the promotion of self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-
reliance and the interdependence of member states.130  
SADC Tribunal was formed through the ideology and vision of the drafters of the 1992 Treaty, 
however, this vision was realized through the 2000, Tribunal Protocol.131 The mandate of the 
tribunal is spelt out in the Treaty “the Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and 
proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate 
any such disputes as may be referred to it.”132 
The SADC Tribunal was originally established to resolve economic disputes. However, this does 
not mean that the Tribunal was precluded from adjudicating human rights issues in that the 
preamble to the Treaty and its article 4(c) indeed refer to “human rights”.133 A case in point is 
Mike Campbell vs. Republic of Zimbabwe, where the constitution of Zimbabwe granted the state 
aright to compulsorily acquire agricultural land while also taking away a corresponding right to 
access to a judicial remedy. It ruled that the ouster clause in the Zimbabwean Constitution that 
precluded the Applicants from litigating their case in the Zimbabwean courts violated the rule of 
law as well as Zimbabwe's international human rights treaty obligations.134 
 
                                                            
129 Maxi Schoeman, From SADCC to SADC and Beyond: The Politics of Economic Integration, 
http://www.alternative-regionalisms.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/schoemaar_fromsadcctosadc.pdf. Accessed on 
12th December, 2016.  
130 Article 5 of the SADC Treaty.  
131 Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community. (2000).  
132 Article 16 of the SADC Treaty. 
133 Article 4(c) principles to the SADC Treaty. 
134 Mike Campbell and other vs. Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) No 2/2007. 
 22 
 
3.6  SRICs as human rights courts 
As it was at the continental level, the realization of human rights was initially not the focus of 
SRICs since they were primarily established for economic purposes.135 However, as challenges 
such as restricted individual access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACtHPR) increase frustration and dissatisfaction with the continental human rights framework, 
victims of human rights violations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
increasingly turned to the developing regimes in the sub-regions for recourse.136  
3.7  The African Human Rights System and the SRIC Courts 
A human rights system comprises of a set of norms and institutions accepted by states as 
binding.137 In the AHRS, these are contained in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) and its protocols and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (ACRWC). These treaties establish the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR),138 the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR)139 and the 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and welfare of the Child (The Committee)140 respectively.  
Generally, national and international human rights are best protected at the domestic or national 
level, which has been described as an ‘inner layer, forming the core of protection’.141 Where the 
victim of violation is unable to find protection at the national sphere, international mechanisms 
for the protection of rights existed at the global and regional spheres as a last resort.142 Within the 
African regional development and as a result of post-colonialism, the African human rights 
system has been viewed as a “western” culture and thus, used by African leaders to ignore or 
negate the international human rights obligations.143 Therefore, with time, the sub-regional 
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communities began the formation of human rights standards which was widely accepted by the 
member states and thus, eliminating the façade of “western indoctrination”.144 
With regard to the AHRS system, the African Commission exercises its mandate in the form of 
receiving and considering state reports and after reviewing the reports, it forwards concluding 
observations to the respective states.145 The complaints mechanism is clearly outlined in the 
African Charter, the Commission may exercise the prerogative of carrying out investigations of 
any human rights violation of any member state,146 or through the communication of gross 
human rights violations from another state.147 Although, the commission has been mandated the 
above powers to investigate and request for a state’s report, they lack the enforcement powers to 
condemn a state’s action or award damages, they may only make recommendations. 148 This 
therefore, only allows for a shaming mechanism of the offending state, and thus an ineffective 
means of dealing with the issue of grave human rights violations.149  
The Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted by the 
34th ordinary session of the General Assembly of OAU, in June 1998 in Burkina Faso.150 The 
mandate of the Court was to act as a complimentary institution to the African Commission, to 
complement the protective mandate of the Commission.151 Cases can be submitted to the Court 
by states parties and the African Commission. References to the Court to be made by individuals 
and NGOs are up on the will and discretion of states parties to the protocol. The court can only 
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allow references by individuals and NGOs if the state has made a declaration accepting the 
competence of the Court.152 
The development of SRICs into human rights courts, created an implication of a complex form 
of human rights system, since the African Court and African Commission no longer have the 
initial monopoly over human rights across the region.153 Within the framework of the SRICs, a 
separate institution solely dealing with human rights is yet to be formed and this gap implies that 
this is a sub-regional integration of governments all with a concern for human rights.154  
The evolution of the African system is captured in the following developments. The 
interpretation of the charters claw back clauses in a manner that is practically nullifying and 
eroding the right channel for human right cases.155 Then there is the strategic manipulation by the 
African commission of its own rules of procedure to further enhance its ability to chart a course 
that diverges from the course set at the inception of the African human rights system.156 The 
commission has also confronted and overcome the dilemmas associated with the enforceability 
of economic, social and cultural rights. This has been done through the clarification of the 
meaning of the African charter’s economic, social and cultural rights and through the creation of 
the economic courts.  
The assertions that the AHRS does not include the role of SRICs must be understood to refer to 
the AHRS as established in the formal documents and institutions of the AU.157 However, it is 
submitted that in view of the depth of integration of human rights into the economic and other 
agenda of the AU, it is difficult to understand human rights in Africa without recognizing the 
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role of SRICs. It is further arguable that despite the absence of an express linkage between 
SRICs and the AHRS, it is undeniable that SRICs sit in a relationship with the AU.158 
Strengthening the existing SRICs and establishing new ones where none exist are the first steps 
on the road towards the agenda of African human rights pursued by the AU.159 Thus, it is argued 
that SRICs as part of the African Economic Courts have a duty to respect and promote human 
rights in their jurisdictions hence the relationship with African human rights system.160 
By analogy, SRIC courts, to the extent that they preside over matters of human rights, can be 
deemed to be in an informal relationship with the African Court and the African Commission. 
Following this, the SRICs act to fill the gaps created by the regional courts, since there is no 
obligation on states to first go the SRICs before submitting a matter to the regional 
courts.161However, it is a pre-requisite that the State first exhaust its local remedies before 
proceeding to apply for a hearing in the regional court.162 Therefore, it is doubtful that the 
ACHPR or ACtHPR could decline to admit a matter on the basis that it has not been heard by the 
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ANALYSIS OF THE SUITABILITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF SRICS AS HUMAN 
RIGHTS COURTS 
4.1  Introduction 
 The sub-regional courts are similar in many ways. Each of the court was created by virtue of the 
existence of a regional economic community whose primary purpose was economic 
liberalization and supplementation of human rights. The aspect of human rights has eventually 
become the most heard cases in the Sub-regional Courts.163 ECOWAS, EAC, and SADC are 
each comprised of a mix of emerging or fragile democracies and authoritarian regimes, all which 
include national legal systems with little tradition of judicial independence and at least some 
countries where the rule of law is fragile or illusory.164 Since many African countries have a 
tradition of a strong executive arms of government and weak judiciaries, then the SRICs are 
likely to be influenced through the strong executives.165  
This chapter will analyze the debate surrounding the suitability of the SRICs as avenues for the 
protection of human rights, considering the economic focus of the courts. It further discuss the 
backlash against International Courts from member states. Through the analysis of different state 
decision’s to either, adhere, negate or simply ignore a court order by seeking the decisions of the 
Courts.  
4.2  An analysis of SRICs as avenues for human rights protection           
4.2.1 The Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 
Many African leaders perceive economic integration as promising vehicles for achieving and 
enhancing socio–economic development in their respective countries.166 This can come about 
through the creation of strong economic community167. The movement of Pan-Africanism tried 
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to lead all of African states towards a united goal of prosperity, democracy and security. 
However, the movement culminated with the establishment of the OAU in 1963.168 
Over the years, regional economic institutions have been established with the failure of the OAU 
to establish a single economic community. However, the organization adopted the Abuja Treaty-
the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991.169 
It was with the signing of the Treaty of Abuja that created the AEC, the Common Market of 
Africa that the foundations of a future economically integrated and united Africa can be seen.170 
The Treaty envisages the creation of an African Economic Community over a period of thirty-
four years using six defined stages of evolution.171 It also stipulates that African states must 
endeavor to strengthen the RECs in particular by coordinating, harmonizing and progressively 
integrating their activities in order to realize the establishment of AEC.172 
The Abuja Treaty changed the form of Africa's integration process by providing for the creation 
of a Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice and a Solidarity and Compensation Fund.173 It also 
envisioned the economic integration of Africa in six notable stages, and one of its key features is 
that RECs are recognized to be the building blocks of an economically integrated continent.174 
The intended strategy for achieving the key integration objectives, as enshrined in the Abuja 
Treaty, involves: promoting gradual liberalization of regional and intra-regional trade; 
coordination and harmonization of activities of all RECs;175 the establishment of free trade areas 
(FTA) and a customs unions at REC level; and finally achieving both a monetary and economic 
union, final stages in the establishment of an African Economic Community.176 
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The Abuja Treaty affirms and declares the adherence of the parties to recognize, promote and 
protect human rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights as a principle of the Community177. Article 3 provides that the contracting 
parties 
'in pursuit of the objectives stated in article 4 of this treaty (AEC Treaty) solemnly affirm 
and declare their adherence to the following principles…‘(g) recognition, promotion and 
protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.’ 
4.2.2 Promoting human rights: A mandate for RECs? 
Assuming that the responsibility for upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms rests 
primarily on the individual states themselves, the question may arise as to the role that SRICs 
play when it comes to the protection of human rights, and whether or not – and if so, how – 
SRICs can function as guardians of human rights.178 In some way or another, SRICs have 
incorporated the respect for and/or promotion of human rights into their constitutive instruments. 
Therefore, SRICs do indeed have the duty to translate human rights principles and ideals into 
practice.179 
The adoption of the Abuja Treaty, came up with the use of SRICs as pillars for continental 
economic integration. Thus the link created by the SRICs, AU and AEC needed to align the 
principles of the SRICs with the policy and principles of the AU and AEC. Thus, some of the 
SRICs have revised their constitutive treaties, re-established and re-structured their institutions 
and consequently included the principles of recognition and protection of human rights in their 
treaties. 
SRICs are not only incorporated norms of human rights in to their constitutive instruments, but 
also translated human rights principles and ideals into practice. This can be realized by either 
judicial or extra judicial (administrative) means both resulting in the promotion and enforcement 
of human rights.180 Therefore, SRICs incorporated human rights in to their constitutive 
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instrument, using their various institutions, respect, promote and enforce human rights that are 
laid down in their legal instruments, in the African Charter or in other various instruments.181 
Enforcing and promoting human rights outside of courts is, in the first place, realized by merely 
administrative means.182 The legal instruments of SRIC places the onus on member states and 
institutional organs to act in accordance with specific principles such as the rule of law, 
democracy or respect for human rights.183 Therefore, in my view, SRICs decision-making 
processes should always be guided by human rights principles laid down in such legal 
instruments, or that apply because they are general principles of customary law.184 Thus, it can 
be stated that specific principles of human rights are authoritative when it comes to decisions 
taken by SRIC.185 
On the judicial side, the enforcement of human rights within SRICs works through the activities 
of regional community courts or similar institutions.186 Most SRICs have judicial bodies that deal 
with any controversies relating to the interpretation or application of community law.187 
Depending on how human rights are incorporated into the legal frameworks of different SRICs, 
sub-regional organizations have a number of options open to them in respect of enhancing the 
protection of human rights.188 
Considering that human rights do, to some extent, form part of the community law of all SRICs, 
their regional community courts can unquestionably contribute towards the promotion and 
protection of human rights, provided that decisions by regional judicial institutions are properly 
enforced at a national level.189 
Finally, a critical issue faced by SRIC on upholding human rights is the issue of concurrent 
jurisdiction and overlapping memberships.190  
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The issue of the conflicting jurisdiction of regional courts on the African continent will become a 
prominent one with specific importance in cases involving violations of human rights, as many 
regional judicial bodies have the jurisdiction over human rights cases.191 For the time being, the 
consequence of overlapping jurisdiction is that a claimant may in fact choose to which judicial 
body a case is submitted, since a competent court may not decline jurisdiction on the grounds 
that another court may be competent as well.192 In terms of regional integration, the absence of a 
judicially integrated Africa is, however, undeniably a problem because different judicial bodies 
may interpret one normative source differently.193 
4.3  Analysis of SRICs 
The regional economic courts have certain important features that are common to them and they 
include: 
1. Lack of complementarity across SRICs 
Almost all regional economic integration communities have trade protocols, but these are 
different despite the provision that they will eventually adopt a single continental trade 
agreement.194 Because regions priorities are different, each protocol emphasizes different 
issues.195 They therefore, implement programs that vary in intensity, schedule, effect on national 
policies and other features.  
2. Lengthy negotiation process 
All protocols have taken time to conclude and as a result these delays have made it difficult to 
adhere to the provision of the treaties for instance most trade liberalization had to be rescheduled 
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3. Uneven signing, ratification and implementation. 
Some,  if  not  most,  member  countries  in  Africa  do  not  sign  or  ratify  protocols,  or 
even submit  them  timeously.197  For  example, in  the  case  of  the  SADC,  the Summit  review
ed 
and approved  15  protocols,  but  the  DRC  has  neither  ratified  nor  signed  any  protocol.  No 
member state has ratified more than 11 protocols, except for Botswana.198 
4. Uneven interest in the provision of protocols  
Some member countries are not that eager to implement certain protocols.199 This has been 
reported to be mainly island countries which 
have little interest in protocols on rail, road, or inland water 
way transport. In other cases, countries sign but show less interest and commitment in ratifying p
rotocols, because they stand to benefit less than other parties or even.200 
The challenges facing the economic and human rights integration process are among others the 
existence of political instability in Africa is a move against the efforts to integrate African 
economy.201 Another major challenge to the integration process is inadequate infrastructures, 
especially in the transportation and telecommunications among African countries.202 The low 
level of inter-regional and intra-regional trade in Africa is the other challenge. Overlapping 
membership, the unequal distribution of trade benefits between member countries are another 
challenges of the integration process.203 
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The role of SRICs in the protection and promotion of human rights in Africa is relatively new.204 
The contribution of SRIC Courts to the protection of rights in Africa notwithstanding, there are 
concerns respecting their suitability in this regard and how this impacts on the discourse on 
human rights in the continent.205 
Whether the SRICs newly established mandate is a “blessing” or a “curse” depends on the 
advantages of the sub-regional human rights system as opposed to the regional human rights 
system.206 
5. Exhaustion of local remedies 
At the regional level of the human rights system, before instituting a matter in the African 
Court or the African Commission, the state must first of all exhaust all local remedies, 
“Communications relating to Human and Peoples’ rights referred to in Article 55 received by 
the Commission, shall be considered if they: Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, 
unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged.” 207  
The rationale of the local remedies rule both in the Charter and other international instruments 
is to ensure that before proceedings are brought before an international body, the State 
concerned must have had the opportunity to remedy the matter through its own local 
system.208 This prevents the Commission from acting as a court of first instance rather than a 
body of last resort.209 
It is clear in the African context that the struggle between the African Charter supported human 
rights legal framework, on the one hand, while on the other lies domestic legal systems heavily 
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influenced by autocratic State regimes seemingly “disconnected” from the human rights 
demands of their populace is the impediment to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies.210 
This rule can have a dual effect as per Mr. Ruwange, the first is the positive where it enables the 
parties to have a fair remedy and justice to be served, if the state is an oppressive and it                         
is likely that the is no partiality. This would be contrary to Article 10 of the Universal declaration 
of Human Rights which provides that “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations”.211 The negative one is when the case is then gripped with multiple cases from all 
facets of the law and this creates an implication of a court which is “a jack of all trades and a 
master of none.”212 This double effect means that the court must base their decision of which 
case to admit based on the strict interpretation of the treaty’s provisions.  
4.4   The question of human rights and trade 
The underlying aim of the regional and sub-regional trade facets are based on the main aim of 
trade liberalization and the end game being a global economy. Jokes about economists often 
build on the notion that economists rarely agree with each other. Yet, there is at least one 
proposition on which virtually all economists agree—trade liberalization raises living standards 
in the aggregate.213 There is essentially only one argument for free trade, but it is an exceedingly 
powerful one, namely: Free trade promotes a mutually profitable division of labor, greatly 
enhances the potential real national product of all nations, and makes possible higher standards 
of living all over the globe.214 
In turn, the growth in real income that results from more open trade will promote human rights to 
the degree that the demand for human rights is likely “income elastic.”215 There are good reasons 
to believe that this will be true for many rights. Note that almost all human rights are, in one 
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manner or another, costly. The protection of rights generally requires a legal system that is 
effective and credible, and such systems do not come free.216 
The interrelationship between human rights and economic development has become closer over 
the past few years due to increasing discussions in the world community on the issue.217 This 
interconnection can be seen as a two-way relationship insofar as economic development is 
obliged to respect human rights in a democratic society. Conversely, human rights can be given 
more effect through economic growth, as one outcome of economic growth is the increasing 
availability of resources, resulting in the reduction of poverty and a higher standard of living.218 
With regards to SRICs, all SRICs analyzed here have, to some extent, incorporated human rights 
into their treaties. In most cases, a general tribute to recognizing and protecting human rights can 
be found in the basic legal concepts underpinning SRICs.219 One of the reasons for the 
development of human rights into the SRICs structure certainly is that states have committed 
themselves to respecting human rights by acceding to specific human rights treaties, conventions 
or declarations on the international, regional and sub-regional level, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights;220 the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights221 and 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;222 the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
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BACKLASH FROM AFRICAN STATES 
. 
5.1  Introduction 
This section of the paper discusses the attempt by African states to suppress the decisions of 
the Sub-regional Economic Courts, as a response to politically incriminating decisions by the 
Courts.225 In the EAC, the revolutions against the SRICs began as a result of a decision 
nullifying an election into the sub-regional legislature. The Southern-African Region’s 
revolution however, was due to a decision against the Government of Zimbabwe for Human 
dignity violations and racial discrimination. Lastly, the ECOWAS revolution was instigated 
by the non-compliance by the President of the Gambia, thus, the lack of any enforcement 
mechanism led to the suppression of ECOWAS Community Court.226  
This analysis will be done based on individual analysis of the courts, with regard to case law 
and the reasons which led to the backlash. 
5.2  Reasons for backlash 
The African state has been such a notorious human rights violator that skepticism about its 
ability to create an effective regional human rights system is appropriate.227 The African 
system has been deeply rooted in the vesting of all powers in one individual, in this case the 
president.228 According to Mr. Ruwange, the above assertion is in the affirmative since, many 
leaders across Africa lead with an iron fist and are not willing to relinquish or share the power 
that has been vested in them.229 Therefore, in this context the legislature and judiciary can be 
easily coerced and controlled by the executive.230 
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5.3 The Economic Community of West African States Court 
In 2005 the Economic Community of West African States passed a Supplementary Protocol 
which extended the human rights jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court through Article 3 and 
4.231 The Article respectively provide that, “The Court has jurisdiction to determine case of 
violation of human rights that occur in any Member State,”232 and that “Individuals and 
corporate bodies in proceedings from the determination of an act or inaction of a Community 
official which violates the rights of the individuals or corporate bodies.”233 
This expansion of jurisdiction was challenged by the Gambian case, which was filed by an 
NGO, The Media Foundation for West Africa, on behalf of a journalist who had been arrested 
and supposedly tortured for publishing news articles which were crucial to the government.234 
The country of Gambia has been one of the most undemocratic states in Africa and ruled by 
an iron fist which was led by the ideologies of a police state. The security organs were the 
strongest forces in the state and operated on the basis of detention and torture towards any 
individual who was against the establishment.235 
Due to the repressive and autocratic nature of the Gambian government, the ECOWAS 
interference in the matter caused an uproar and at the same time received a deafening response 
full of silence.236 It was said by a human rights lawyer, “Jammeh (the “former” president of 
Gambia) had already “conquered his own judiciary,” and he “refused to be bound by a court in 
Abuja” (the state in which ECOWAS Court sits).237  
The ECOWAS Court ordered the Gambia to comply on many occasions, however, the state 
defied all orders and did not make any appearances or file any documents as evidence to the 
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contrary of the allegations above. In this matter, the ECOWAS Court finally gave an “ex-parte” 
judgment against the Gambia, finding the Gambia responsible for torture and other human rights 
abuses and ordering the government to release the journalist from detention and pay him U.S. 
$100,000.238  
The case above is a clear illustration of the backlash from the West African state of Gambia, 
however, a conclusive illustration is the recommendations by the member states of the creation 
of a Judicial Council,239 to screen applications for open judgeships and recommend a slate of the 
best qualified candidates to the member states.240 The aim of this was to ensure a delay in the 
institutions proceedings and also hinder the access by individuals and NGO’s to the court.241 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 26 provides for the doctrine of “Pacta 
Sunt Servada,” it states that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.” 242The ECOWAS Treaty, subscribes and dictates the 
jurisdiction of the court over any and all matters between member state which are in accordance 
or contrary to the treaty and that all judgments rendered by the ECOWAS Court is binding on all 
states members of the  ECOWAS Community.243 The action by the government of Gambia is in 
contravention of the Articles mentioned above, since, the State of Gambia is a member of the 
ECOWAS Community, and by this virtue accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.  
However, the push towards recusing the ECOWAS Court’s human rights jurisdiction was not 
limited to the ignorance of the Courts decision, the president of Gambia went further to request 
the Secretariat of ECOWAS permission to revise the ECOWAS Treaty.244 The proposal by the 
Gambia included clauses to ensure that before the ECOWAS grants a state standing, the party 
must ensure that they have exhausted all local remedies, and even after this process the party 
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may only institute the claim after twelve months.245 Such a provision was aimed at weakening 
the Court especially in regard to the human rights jurisdiction and in effect reduce the Courts 
ability to deal with tyrannical governments.246  
Although the Gambia, strongly pursued the ECOWAS Court to ensure its failure, this campaign 
however, had the opposite effect, where the Court has continued to hear matters relating to 
human rights.247 Especially so after the swearing in of new judges into the court, the human 
rights enthusiasm has now received a new fresh solid foundation.248 
5.4 The East African Court of Justice 
The most controversial aspect of the EACJ is the human rights jurisdiction it has been conferred, 
since unlike the ECOWAS Court and the SADC Tribunal, the EAC Treaty does not directly 
allow the EACJ to infer the human rights jurisdiction.249 The EAC Treaty specifies that, “the 
EACJ shall have a human rights jurisdiction as will be determined by the [EAC] Council at a 
suitable subsequent date” once member states have agreed to a Protocol to extend the 
jurisdiction.250 This in the case of the EAC is yet to be done. 
The case of Rugumba vs. Secretary General of East African Community,251 where a Rwandan 
citizen had been held incommunicado without trial for a period of five months, the EACJ 
therefore, interpreted their jurisdiction through Article 6 (d), 7 (2) and 27(2) of the EAC treaty 
which all identified and discussed the human rights aspect of the agreement. Further to this the 
court also made reference to Article 7 (2) of the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights,252 and asserted that “these provisions were not decorative or cosmetic parts of the Treaty 
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but were “meant to bind Partner States.”253 The court declined to hold that exhaustion of the 
Treaty’s statute of limitations was a bar to bringing the suit.254 
However, the case which disputed the jurisdiction and caused a revolt against the EACJ was the 
Kenyan case of Anyang Nyong’o v. Attorney General of Kenya (hereinafter Nyong’o case),255 
where the opposition disputed the division of candidates for the East African Legislative 
Assembly based on the national parliament’s political strength. The EACJ decided this case in 
favour of the opposition and rejected the list of candidates. As a result of this decision, Kenya 
reacted by threatening to revoke the two judges sitting on the EACJ, one of whom was the 
president of the court.256 The reasoning behind the formal application for recusal was that Kenya 
claimed “argued that because the judges had been suspended from their duties on Kenyan courts 
due to allegations of corruption, they could not render a fair judgment in the Nyong’o case”. This 
move by Kenya, was centered on making the EACJ a powerless force, also that the doctrine of 
state sovereignty was breached by the EACJ when they interfered with sensitive local matters.257 
With regard to the efforts by Kenya, the stronghold of the EAC was upheld since, Uganda and 
Tanzania stood by the EAC and refused to back the efforts by Kenya to cripple the EACJ and to 
recuse its judges.258  
The second chapter of this research paper discusses the legal positivist theory, such school of 
thought would argue that the action by the EACJ, is ultra-vires based on the provisions in the 
treaty, whereas it can be argued that the EACJ is trying to re-write the judicial authority of the 
Treaty.259 It is however important to also acknowledge the forms of statutory interpretation in 
international law, first would be that which supports the positivist school of thought, as per 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
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its object and purpose. This means that although the court may consult other sources to realize 
the meaning of the text within the treaty, they will only interpret that meaning in the ordinary and 
natural meaning regardless of the unfair outcome.260 If this school of thought was to take the day 
then it would be decided that the EACJ was acting ultra vires, since the treaty does not confer 
any direct human rights on the court. The treaty only provides for the importance of upholding 
good governance and adherence to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.261 This 
being the basis of the Kenyan government when condoning the decision against them by the 
EACJ in the Nyongo Case, a counter argument was given in the case of Katabazi described 
below. 
On the other hand, Article 2 of the Vienna Convention262 also provides for the purposive 
interpretation of the Treaty, which looks to the text of the treaty, any annexes of the treaty and 
any agreement relating to the treaty made between states. The case of James Katabazi and 21 
Others v Secretary General of the East African Community and the Attorney General of the 
Republic of Uganda,263 where although the Court conceded that Article 27 of the EAC Treaty did 
not confer direct human rights jurisdiction to the EACJ,264 it held that this fact does not limit the 
court from having jurisdiction in matters of any violation of the treaty’s provisions. In this 
regard, therefore, the court ruled that there had been a violation of rule of law and thus, the state 
as held accountable.  
5.5  The South African Development Tribunal 
The SADC Tribunal, being in the hub of many African autocratic rule, where states are not 
willing to relinquish their sovereignty in favor of the regional integration.265 The court was faced 
with its major human rights case in the first year of its existence, which was filed by Mike 
Campbell, a white settler, for violation of his right to property, also alleging discrimination on 
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the basis of race, lack of due process in the deprivation of property, and denial of access to the 
courts.266 The argument that the SADC Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in hearing human rights 
cases was summarily dismissed by the court, and Zimbabwe was further found to have been in 
violation of the “white” land-owners right in three ways, denying access to justice, 
discriminating on the basis of race, and failing to provide fair compensation.267 
The decision by the SADC Tribunal against Zimbabwe was not received well by the President 
Mugabe, who began to challenge the courts credibility and its jurisdiction.268 At the August 2010 
Summit, Mugabe “threatened to block any discussion of Zimbabwe and its human rights 
record,269 since, the state viewed the decision by the Court as an interference of the sovereignty 
and independence if Zimbabwe.270 The demise of the SADC Tribunal was initiated by this 
Zimbabwean case, where in 2010, the heads of states within the SADC community suspended 
the Tribunal for six months, and therefore, allowing Zimbabwe to assert that due to the 
suspension, the holding against the state was unenforceable.271 In this regard, the heads of state 
further declined to reappoint the judges to the Tribunal, and thus leaving the court inquorate and 
inoperative.272 
In 2011, there had been a formal request for an external review of the SADC Tribunal’s decision 
against Zimbabwe, the independent expert charged with this review issued a report.273 This 
report confirmed the validity of the Tribunal’s constitution, and its authority to review human 
rights complaints initiated by private litigants.274 This report only goes to assert the formal 
jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal to hear any cases that are in contravention of the SADC 
Treaty.275 
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In an interview with Mr. Ruwange, he stated that International law is like a “dog without teeth,” 
and without any enforcement mechanism this court will remain to be at the mercy of the heads of 
state.276 This is clearly the case with the SADC Tribunal where as a result of the decision of the 
Court (the Campbell case) a head of state was able to cripple the Court. The decision of this 
court however, in theory should be binding to all states that are members of the SADC 
Community. 277 In this matter the government of Zimbabwe quickly dismissed the decision by 
the SADC Tribunal finding Zimbabwe to have violated human rights of the “white settlers,” and 
initiated the lobbying towards the disbandment of the Tribunal and the removal of the 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter will give an overview of the discussions made in all other chapters and thus make 
findings on all the issues which have been assessed through the research, it will endeavor to 
answer the research questions provided. This being the last chapter of the research paper, it will 
summarize the discussion and make the relevant recommendations and conclude on the issue of 
the SRICs as human rights courts.  
6.1   Summary of research findings 
The research was analyzing the suitability of SRIC’s as human rights courts through an in-depth 
analysis of the historical development of the courts and also the development of their human 
rights mandate. In addition, the research further analyzed the court in relation to the African 
Human Rights System and the relationship between the SRICs and the African states.  
It was established that the hypothesis asserted in the first chapter were all false, since after the 
research conducted, the analysis finalized and a comparison done between the regional and sub-
regional system, the contrary is the truth. The sub-regional system is the most effective form of 
ensuring adherence to human rights law, because many states have realized that a stable human 
rights system would lead to an effective and efficient economic system and thus further the main 
aim of the SRICs trade liberalization and economic growth of member states. 
It is therefore, my finding that the SRICs are not only efficient, but also more effective as human 
rights advocates and adjudicators as opposed to their regional counterparts, the African Court of 
Human and People’s Rights and the African Commission.  
6.2  Recommendations 
The African Commission on human rights and the African Court on human and people’s rights 
constitute the core institutional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights 
under the African Human Rights System. In light of the infancy of the African human rights 
system, the elaboration and alignment of policies and approaches, while respecting key 
institutional differences, is yet to be undertaken. The upshot is that its function has been realized 
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only to a very limited extent. Towards this end, the following part raises key issues on how 
SRIC’s as human rights court efficiency can be improved 
1. Pro-active Complementarity between the African Human Right’s System and 
the SRIC’S 
Although the enhancement of the efficiency of the protective mandate is the main locus between 
the African human rights system and the SRIC’s, the African Charter and the preamble to the 
Court’s constitutive instrument suggest that complementarity between the institutions is not 
confined to the to the protective sphere278. The African Human rights constitutive instrument 
invokes complementarity as the guiding principle for its relation with the African commission, 
though it provides little guidance on the nature of objectives of complementarity as an organizing 
principle. 
Complementarity’s meaning and implication can be constructed from the structure of the human 
rights system and its overriding purpose can be understood namely as; First, the primary 
objective of complementarity as functional; its purpose is to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the system279. Second, complementarity as a relation purpose280, to organize and 
regulate the relationship between the commission and the court under a system of shared 
jurisdictional competence and collective enforcement. Finally complementarity as normative; to 
act as an inspirational medium for realizing the norms and constitutional goods envisaged under 
the African Human Rights System. 
Another avenue where complementarity can be useful is on amicable settlements; this has been 
lost from the text of the new protocol.281 It could be argued that since this is best done by quasi-
judicial bodies like the African Commission,282 cases for amicable settlement are among those 
that the court may have transferred under this provision. Also, the rules of Procedure of the court 
should lay down detailed conditions under which the court shall consider cases brought before it, 
                                                            
278 Article 45(1)(c) of the African charter grants the commission express power to “co-operate with other African 
and International institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights”. 
279 Solomon T. Ebobrah, “Towards a positive Application of Complementarity in the African Human Rights System: 
issues of function and Relations” 22 EJIL 663 (2011). 
280 Solomon T. Ebobrah, “Towards a positive Application of Complementarity in the African Human Rights System: 
issues of function and Relations” (2011). 
281 Article 9 of the 1998 Protocol on the Establishment of the ACtHPR. 
282 African Human Rights Journal 2, 995 et seq (199-201) (2002). 
 45 
 
bearing in mind the complementarity between the commission and the court.283 This can be 
interpreted as granting the commission some functions of filtering cases, or at the very least, 
advising the Court on admissibility of cases.284 
2. Direct access for Individuals and NGOs 
Under Article 5 (1) of the 1998 Protocol, only the African Commission, State Parties and African 
Intergovernmental Organizations had automatic access to the court. In contrast, the Court had the 
discretion to allow NGOs with observer status at the African Commission and individual to 
institute cases directly before it,285 provided that the state party concerned had made a 
declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive such cases at the time of ratification 
of the protocol or anytime thereafter.286 
While the granting of locus stand to individuals and NGOs to the new court regardless of 
whether they are victims or directly affected by the complaint is a progressive move, the key 
concern remains the restricted direct access of Individuals and NGOs under the Protocol and 
statute to the new court. Direct access of individuals to any human rights system is based on; 
first, the leitmotif of human rights is to insulate the individual from the “predatory state”,287 a 
scheme which necessitates platforms accessible to individuals to complain in cases of violations. 
This view is based on the liberal theory of human rights that further rests on the thesis that 
individuals are the foremost consumers of human rights system of which the African court is 
part. The same state, presented on an image of the poacher,288 cannot be granted the primary 
remit to seek redress on behalf of individuals whose rights it has violated through its acts or 
omissions. 
Secondly, the underlying intent of human rights law is to provide legal remedy in cases of 
violations of rights guaranteed. Human rights are not intended to be pious platitudes, but rather 
justiciable claims through among other means, adjudication.  The vindication of these rights is 
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generally to be initiated by individual claimants and bearers of these rights. The case for 
unfettered access of individuals and NGOs to the African Court is thus to be viewed from the 
optic of enabling aggrieved parties to seize the Court for obtaining justice or remedies to which 
they are entitled. Consequently, this will also have the effect of elucidating the scope of the 
African Charter and other human rights instruments which the Court will apply. 
3. Increased role of interveners  
It is no longer in dispute that international law is not exclusively the law of nations. States are no 
longer considered the only players in international law and governance, but also other non-state 
entities like individuals.289 Nowhere is this better illustrated than in international human rights 
law, where individuals and NGOs are influential participants in standard setting, monitoring, 
reporting, advocacy, litigation, enforcement and other human rights protection measures. The 
latter has entailed actions before judicial or quasi-judicial organs, ranging from instituting cases 
as parties or petitioning requests for advisory opinions to acting as interveners or amici curiae in 
contentious cases or advisory opinions. 
In the African human rights system, NGOs have played a phenomenal role in human rights 
protection. Most individual communications before the African Commission have been lodged 
by or at the initiative of these organizations,290 even where they are not “victims” or “directly 
affected” by the violations alleged.291 This implies that the African Charter, as was held in 
SERAC v. Nigeria,292 allows actio popularis. By the same token, there has been a practice of 
amicus curiae briefs before the African Commission, albeit limited. However, it is not clear if the 
Commission also allows interveners before it.  
The exclusion of these entities may have an effect since interveners have different rights in a 
judicial process as they generally become parties to the proceeding, with the rights and 
obligations attached to that status.293 
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6.3  Conclusion 
The role that has been played by the SRICs as human rights adjudicators and advocates cannot 
be denied, and therefore it is crucial that the Regional human rights courts and the SRICs find a 
means of working together, so as to avoid an instance of overlap of jurisdiction and contradicting 
decisions.  Generally, this new form of Courts has employed a new form of thirst for human 
rights surety and created an implication of Africa’s vision towards a committed human rights 
upholding continent. The success of the SRICs as human rights courts will highly depend on the 
willingness of states to revisit the AHRS and to align the operations of the SRICs with the 
regional framework.  
The issue of backlash from African states has absolutely hindered the progress of the SRICs as 
human rights adjudicators and enforcers, this through the research conducted has been as a result 
of the unwillingness to surrender power, through corporation with the courts.  
The fact that there are multiple courts which have human rights jurisdiction across the AHRS, 
means that the states and citizens of the states will scout for standing in any court that will hear 
their matter. This creates the implication that the courts effect among member states will be less 
and therefore in the long run lead to a destruction of any form of compliance.  Thus as has been 
suggested above, to avoid this a hierarchical structure be implemented and the doctrine of 
complementarity be in the framework of the AHRS.  
The issue of culture and tradition has been seen as a stumbling block for the SRICs progression 
in the African human rights scope, this is based on mentality and the disruption of the internal 
systemic conditions. Although, there are legal agendas linked to the SRICs stumbles, the cultural 
denomination is the underlying factor, it would therefore, be imperative that states recognize the 
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